INDISPENSABLE PARTY: THE HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF A PROCEDURAL PHANTOMf GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.*
In spite of the vast number of cases that have arisen concerning who are necessary and who are indispensable parties, the governing principles have remained comparatively simple and constant ...... "Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and in good conscience" are indispensable . ... Unless the absence of an indispensable party can be and is cured by his joinder, dismissal must be granted.
1
Conventional procedural terminology divides parties to litigation into four general categories: "improper" parties, "proper" parties, "necessary" parties, and "indispensable" parties. 2 Application of the rule embodied in the first three categories is today rarely the subject of practical or analytical difficulty. An improper party is one whose relation to the controversy is so remote that he ought not to be in court; a proper party is one whose relation to the controversy is such that he may appropriately be brought into the litigation but whose absence will occasion no concern; a necessary party is one whose relation to the controversy is such that in the interests of orderly and consistent judicial administration he should be brought in if at all possible. 8 The indispensable party concept, however, has occasioned much confusion in the cases. According to conventional doctrine, an indispensable party is one whose relationship to the controversy is so immediate and so intimate that the court is said to be unable to proceed without him. 4 The crucial difference between a necesary and an indispensable party is said to be this: if a necessary party cannot be brought before the court for one reason or another (for example, because he is outside the territorial limits to which the court's process runs), the court may nevertheless proceed to dispose of the controversy as best it can. On the other hand, if a party is indispensable
INDISPENSABLE PARTY
and is not amenable to process, the court must refuse to adjudicate; it is said to lack jurisdiction in the absence of the indispensable party. Thus does this ghostly character haunt the halls of justice,'an apparition whose suggested existence stays the hand of the law. Professor John Reed has made an admirable analysis of the indispensable party rule, laying bare the logical and practical fallacies that underlie the jurisdictional theory of indispensability. 5 As he points out, the fallacy lies in the assumption that because the court does not have jurisdiction over the absentee, it can not act with respect to those before it. 6 Again as Professor Reed points out, this idea is just plain nonsense. Ordinarily courts do not espouse nonsensical ideas; certainly they do not do so advertently. Where, then, did this strange idea of indispensability originate? Professor Reed has traced the development of the doctrine from the earliest United States Supreme Court cases, through the leading 1854 case of Shields v. Barrows, 7 down to its present applications. It is the purpose of this article to explore the earlier history of the rules governing parties to equity suits in order to show the background of procedural law against which the indispensable party rule emerged. This analysis will cover the period between the emergence of "modern equity" in the latter part of the seventeenth century and the reception of developed equity procedure by American courts in the early nineteenth century.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Chancery developed fairly workable necessary party rules, with exceptions designed to meet practical convenience and necessity. These rules may be summarized as follows:
1. All persons who are interested in a controversy are necessary parties to a suit involving that controversy, so that a complete disposition of the dispute may be made.
In about 1780 and the three decades that followed, a confused series of opinions were rendered which attempted to establish an additional rule: no decree that does not completely dispose of the controversy will be entered. Upon this rule is founded the indispensable party notion. It was conceived in dictum and lives by inertia. It should long since have been laid to rest.
I. THE NECESSARY PARTY RULE IN THE LATE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY-
LoRD NOTTINGHAM Analysis of the early cases dealing with necessary parties may begin with those decided in the time of Lord Nottingham, Lord Keeper and Lord Chancellor of England from 1673 to 1682. This seems appropriate for several reasons. Nottingham presided in Chancery at the time of its emergence from the shadow of the Interregnum and during the completion of its transition from administrative repository of the royal prerogative to judicial tribunal in the modem sense. 8 Further, Nottingham himself sought to systematize the rules of equity, both substantive and procedural, and is rightly called the "father of systematic equity." 9 Finally, it is only with Nottingham that a significant number of decisions begin to be reported and reliance is regularly placed on precedent-essential conditions for the firm development of doctrine, procedural or substantive.' 0 Nottingham's decisions are available in two sources: the rather fragmentary reports printed in the eighteenth century," and Nottingham's own manuscript of notes on cases, which was recently published by the Selden Society. 12 Because of the remarkable similarity of Nottingham's cases to present day cases in regard to the parties problems posed and the solutions developed, it seems desirable to give some account of his decisions. 299-303 (1924) [ It is difficult to assess the respective importance as eighteenth century precedent of the cases in the printed reports as opposed to those reported in Nottingham's manuscript. Of course, the contents of Nottingham's private manuscript, not published until the twentieth century, could not have served as precedent in the eighteenth. However, the first eighteenth century publication of the reports of Nottingham's decisions appeared in 1725 and only as that century wore on were more reports published. See Yale, Introduction, 73 Seld. Soc'y xliv. For want of published precedents, practitioners and judges apparently relied on what could be found by poring over the decree and order books of the court. Ibid. By this means many lawyers may and some must have come upon the cases that Nottingham had discussed in his manuscript. Hence, it is quite possible that the materials on which Nottingham relied for his manuscript, and not the cases in the printed reports, constituted the precedents from which eighteenth century law developed. This was almost certainly the case prior to 1725. For present purposes the question is largely moot, however, for the cases dealing with parties problems in the printed reports and those in Nottingham's manuscript are substantially the same in approach and doctrine.
See 5 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 217-18,
As a general rule, Nottingham recognized that all persons having an interest in the controversy ought to be parties.3
3 Thus, joint obligees should join as plaintiffs 14 and joint obligors should be joined as defendants 15 in suits to enforce joint obligations; in a suit by a bond surety to compel the creditor to assign the bond to the surety so that he can indemnify himself against the principal, the principal should be joined ;16 all holders of interests in a common should be joined in a bill to establish an enclosure;17 in a suit to obtain an undivided fractional interest in a block of the shares of a company, all owners of portions of the block should be joined ;18 and in a bill for accounting against a bankrupt, the bankrupt's assignees in bankruptcy should be joined.' 9 Again, in a bill for an accounting and payment of the share of a deceased member of a mercantile venture, all members of the venture should be made parties ;20 and in a bill by legatees claiming a right to the residue of an estate, all persons interested in the estate should be parties. 21 In these cases, Nottingham did not rely on the indispensability doctrine. On the contrary, he relied on practical considerations of fairness and expediencyavoidance of a multiplicity of actions, 22 assurance of adequate presentation of [T]he bill charges several miscarriages and surprises upon the Lady Harvey and several other defendants and demands several accounts. The defendant demurs because he is not concerned in many of the charges of the bill... . Yet ordered to answer, because all the matters are so complicated and intermixt that they cannot conveniently be severed. Note the use of a convenience test and the application of a joinder principle that can fairly be described as "common question of law or fact." Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 20. See also Lukin v. Midleton, 73 Seld. Soe'y 340 (No. 476) (Ch. 1676) (suit by a shareholder of a company to obtain shares as against several persons, each of whom claimed a portion of the shares).
Not directly relevant but nevertheless interesting is
14. the issues and relevant evidence, 23 efficient use of judicial effort, 24 and avoidance of inconsistent adjudication between different parties to the transaction.
The consideration last mentioned, avoidance of inconsistent results, was discussed in Woodcock v. Mayne, 25 a case significant not only because of its sound reasoning but also because a century later this reasoning was ignored and the decision, swallowed up in the dogma of indispensability. 20 A junior encumbrancer brought a bill to require a prior mortgagee to redeem so that the junior encumbrancer could enforce his claim ;27 the defendant objected, contending that the heir of the mortgagor should be made a party. In sustaining the objection, Nottingham reasoned:
[T]he heir of the mortgagor to whom the equity of redemption is descended is not made party, so that either the account to be now taken of what is due upon the mortgage will conclude the heir, or it will not. If it must conclude him, then 'tis fit the heir should be called in and made privy to it. If it will not conclude him, then the defendant will be in danger to account twice unless the heir be party. So either for the heir's sake or for the defendant's sake there is a necessity of amending this bill and making the heir a party.
28
It should be noted that while the opinion did not clearly indicate whether the absent heir would be bound by the result of the accounting taken in his absence, Nottingham felt quite strongly that the heir should not be so bound, This inclination in time ripened into settled law 29 and now, of course, reposes in the due process clause. 8 0 Nottingham's primary concern, then, was not that the heir would be bound. 3 31. The supposition that the absentee will be bound is, of course, the premise of the jurisdictional theory of indispensability. See note 6 sipra.
accounting and hence might subject the defendant to a second and perhaps inconsistent accounting.
2 This analysis not only differs from but is completely antithetical to the later developed notion of indispensability and the premises supposedly underlying it.
Nottingham's practical approach to the problem of necessary parties is revealed with even greater clarity by his decisions excusing joinder of parties who would normally have been considered necessary or, latterly, indispensable. In these decisions, we can discern what would today be called "balancing of conveniences." 33 Plaintiff was required to do all he could to bring in the necessary parties, 34 but their joinder was excused when inconvenient for one reason or another. Thus, in a bill to enforce a charitable charge against certain lands, the defendants' demand that tenants of other lands also subject to the charge be joined was overruled, the defendants being left to their remedy of contribution by separate proceedings. 35 Implicit is the idea, later to become articulate, that the favored action for the benefit of a charity should not be thwarted by the procedural necessities of the defendant. A later case 3 6 involved a bill by an obligee to recover interest due on a bond executed by a number of obligors. The defendants apparently had made an arrangement by which, in rotation, they would fail to appear at hearing, 3 7 so that despite several postponements the plaintiff was unable to get all necessary parties before the court. Nottingham said crisply: "Here was an affected delay. So I decreed for the plaintiff and turned the labour on the defendant to play his aftergame for contribution against the rest."
38
In dealing with the problem of necessary parties who were not before 32. Furthermore, when the absentee is bound by the decree because his rights are derivative from one of the parties, the absentee need not be joined. See Tattswell v. . The terms of the will creating the charitable charge seem to have created what was and still is known as a "joint' obligation, as distinct from a "joint and several" obligation. This did not concern Nottingham; he recognized that the interest in enforcing a charity's claim outweighed the defendant's interest in avoiding a multiplicity of suits and/or being forced to pay a disproportionate amount of the charge. For later instances in which a "joint" obligation was enforced against only one of the joint obligors, see notes 42, 65 infra. The notion that all obligors of a joint obligation are indispensable parties in actions to enforce such an obligation thus seems clearly a later invention. the court, reliance at times was placed on the device known today as the class action ; 39 in other instances, a notion akin to the modern idea of privity seemed to be applied, so that joinder of the absentee was unnecessary because he would be bound by the result reached as to the parties already present. 40 At other times, however, the court simply proceeded to do what it could. The most interesting of these early cases excusing joinder of necessary parties is Walley v. Walley, 4 " the first case to face squarely the question of how to proceed when a necessary party is outside the jurisdiction. Plaintiff's grandfather had established a trust for plaintiff's benefit with his father as trustee. The father breached his fiduciary duty by selling entrusted bonds, and the beneficiary brought suit for an accounting against the buyers, who had notice of the breach. In answer to the defendant's claim that the father should be joined, plaintiff established that his father was with the army in India and hence not amenable to process. Nottingham, applying a principle that had been suggested, and perhaps authoritatively laid down, at an earlier date, 4 2 held quite simply that plaintiff might proceed.
43
The procedural principle disclosed by these cases continued to be applied after Nottingham's tenure as Chancellor. It can be summarized by saying that joinder of all interested parties is required 44 It should be borne in mind that one of the most serious obstacles to prosecution of a multiparty bill was that the suit abated upon death of a party and it was necessary to start over again practically from the beginning. This problem was repeatedly adverted to in the reports.
48. , a testator had devised lands to trustees to sell and pay testator's debts. The trustees, plaintiffs in the action, contracted with defendant for sale of some of the land. To a bill for specific performance, defendant objected that the testator's heir should be joined so was pointed out that plaintiff was limiting his prayer for relief to those defendants before the court. 52 On the other hand, when the defendant was in obvious peril of being subjected to double liability, there was firm insistence that the other claimants be joined. 5 3 In none of these cases, however, was there any mention of indispensable parties.
II. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS

A. The Early Eighteenth Century Treatises
By the first quarter of the eighteenth century there had developed enough consciousness of precedent-and enough precedent of which to be consciousto stimulate the writings of books on Chancery practice. 4 These treatises varied in approach, some being abridgments with a minimum of independent editorial content and others showing some of the narrative style of later treatises. They also varied in quality, ranging from efforts to do a fairly thorough job to little more than hornbooks for students. The attempts at generalization in these works are significant for several reasons: they indicate the thinking of the time; they served as source material for later lawyers; and they reveal the difficulty inherent in formulating rules to deal with the problem of parties to suits. 179-80 (1938) , of which I have examined the second (1704) and fourth (1725). These two editions appear to be the same insofar as they deal with matters relevant to the present inquiry.
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While undoubtedly of value to the contemporary practitioner, it has little to offer today.5 6 The second important practice treatise is Bohun's Cursus Cancellariae. 57 He states the rules governing joinder of parties as follows:
In all suits in Equity great Care is to be taken, that there be proper Parties named in the Bill, for and against whom the Court may respectively make a Decree: For if upon the Face of the Bill it appears that any, whose Right or Interest is concern'd, or who ought to have been, are not made Parties therein, the Defendant may demur to such Bill; or if he does not, yet the Court, upon hearing, will not, for Want of them, proceed to a Decree; or if it does, the Decree may be revers'd; or if it be not revers'd, yet none, but such were made Parties to the Suit, and those claiming under them, can be bound by the Decree. Several observations can be made about this passage. In the first place, Bohun is very vague about who are necessary parties. Such vagueness is characteristic of the procedural writing of that period and many years afterward, and is harmless unless it is treated, as in later years it seems to have been, as purporting to be definitive. More interesting is the fact that Bohun does not mention the exceptions to the necessary party rule. 59 It is possible that this omission by Bohun and later writers, coupled with reiteration of the general rule that all who are interested must be joined, played a part in the later belief that necessary parties meant, in some situations at least, indispensable parties. The point to be observed is that in light of the then decided cases, Bohun must be taken as stating a general principle of procedural policy rather than setting forth with technical accuracy the actual content of the necessary parties rule.
A third writer, Giles Jacob, did not differ much from Bohun. 60 Again, we have what must be regarded as loose generalization rather than precise restatement of procedural law.
B. The Rules in the Middle of the Eighteenth Century
1. Lord Hardwicke. After Lord Nottingham, the next great figure to sit as Lord Chancellor was Phillip Yorke, Lord Hardwicke, who held the office from 1737 to 1756.62 During his tenure, the parties rules developed by Nottingham were more fully articulated. The pattern of decision, however, remained the same.
The general rule, requiring joinder of all interested parties, was ordinarily applied. 63 However, in addition to the cases excusing joinder of an absentee who was out of the country, an exception was recognized when the absent party was not subject to process because he was a party to a proceeding in another court. In such a case, he was treated as being beyond the jurisdiction of the court and his joinder, therefore, was excused.
Darwent v. Walton 6 5 presented, once again, the problem of an absentee beyond the sea. In this case, involving a bill to recover on a joint demand against one of two partners, it was alleged that the absent partner was out of the jurisdiction. Two questions were thereby presented: first, whether plaintiff could proceed at all without joining the other obligor and, second, if he could so proceed, whether the defendant obligor was liable for the entire debt or only half of it. In a carefully reasoned opinion, Hardwicke made it quite clear that the plaintiff could sue one joint obligor and recover the 62. See whole obligation from him. 66 This case indicates as precisely as any that the necessary party rule, in the middle of the eighteenth century, had none of the inexorability of the later indispensable party rule.
The flexibility of the practice in Hardwicke's time is demonstrated by a number of cases in which we find increasingly explicit references to the considerations of procedural policy underlying the necessary party rule and its exceptions. Thus, when the reason for joining an interested party was to obtain contribution from him in favor of one of the parties already joined, the absentee's joinder was not required if he was insolvent.
6 7 Furthermore,
Hardwicke at times adopted the technique, which might commend itself to modern courts, of postponing decision of the parties question until the merits had been investigated, with the end in view that the parties problem might thereupon become moot. 6 8 In two cases at this time the court explicitly engaged in a balancing of competing interests, 6 9 and, after some uncertainty,
Hardwicke noted the adoption of An Act for Making Process in Courts of
Equity, 1732, 5 Geo. 2, c. 25, § 1, which provided that if a defendant who had been summoned refused to appear the court could enter a decree pro confesso against him. He then said:
Before the act, you might carry it on through the whole line of process against a defendant, who did not appear to the sequestration, and no further; but you might, notwithstanding, set down the cause against the other defendant, and have a decree for the whole. If you could do this before the act of parliament, where a person was in the kingdom, but obstinately refused to appear, much more ought the court to make a decree against one partner, where the other is out of the kingdom, that an account should be taken, and the whole which appears to be due the plaintiff should be paid by the defendant, the partner who is brought to a hearing .... determined that the proper disposition of a bill defective in parties is to have it stand over, with amendment if necessary, and not to dismiss it. 7°F inally, the class action was used to obviate joinder, 71 and, again with some uncertainty, the rule that a party not joined is not bound was applied. is particularly noteworthy because it appears to have played an important part in the later emergence of the indispensable party concept. One Snell had established a trust, the proceeds of which were to be used to provide five scholarships at Oxford for Scottish students from the University of Glasgow who promised upon finishing Oxford to enter the Anglican ministry in Scotland. Any surplus from the trust fund was to be used to provide additional scholarships of the same nature. The named trustees were designated officials of the colleges at Oxford. The Snell trust was created during the period when the Anglican Church was the established church in Scotland. When, at the end of the seventeenth century, the Anglican Church was disestablished and the Presbyterian Church reestablished, the Snell trust's immediate purpose failed. Thereupon, Snell's heirs sued the trustees to reclaim the property. Relief was refused, the court applying the cy-pres doctrine and decreeing that the funds should be used: (1) to provide five scholarships for Scottish students from Glasgow University, free of the requirement that the recipients enter the ministry, and (2) the surplus to be used for maintenance of the library at Baliol College, Oxford. The University of Glasgow was not a party to this litigation.
Subsequently, Glasgow demanded that the entire trust fund be used for scholarships for its students and not siphoned off for to be an interesting insistence on the use of the class device. The suit was a bill by two members of a ship's crew who had by deed and assignment been appointed, by sixty-four of the eighty members of the crew, agents for the collection of the sixty-four members' share of the proceeds of a voyage. Defendant's demurrer for failure to make all members of the crew parties was allowed, the Master of the Rolls indicating that plaintiffs should allege that the suit was brought on behalf of the whole crew. Master of the Rolls, contains the precisely opposite thought. In Pawlet v. Bishop of Lincoln, 2 Atk. 296, 26 Eng. Rep. 581 (Ch. 1742), it was said that "you must have all persons before the court who have any pretence to a right; for, by a decree of this court, they will be bound." Id. at 296, 26 Eng. Rep. at 581. In other words, the absentee should be joined, not in order to bind him, but because he will be bound. This is the very kind of wooly thinking that is later found in the indispensable party cases. It seems not to have been the law then and certainly was not the law in later years.
73. 9 Mod. 407, 88 Eng. Rep. 538 (Ch. 1744).
this demand was refused, Glasgow brought the instant proceeding, on relation of the Attorney General, to compel Baliol so to apply the trust fund. Baliol set up the prior decree, 74 to which Glasgow responded that the decree was void because it had not been joined. 75 Hardwicke's response, which covered a number of points, was this:
As to their being not parties, that will not avail them much; for [the prior suit] was not brought in a collusive secret manner ... Glasgow indeed was no party, nor indeed were the plaintiffs [in that suit] obliged to make that University party, for it is a corporation, and out of the kingdom and reach of the process of this court, which is always an excuse for not making them parties: therefore that is no objection to make this a void decree as to them.
76
He then determined that Glasgow could not have the decree set aside.
77
Analyzing this decision in terms of eighteenth century procedural and substantive concepts is perilous, but a few observations can be made. There seems to be the suggestion that the trustees, absent "collusive secret" conduct, adequately represented the interests of the beneficiaries of the trusta notion that, with many refinements, later became established law. 78 The procedural significance of this point is that a person who is adequately represented by someone who is a party need not himself be a party; the absentee will be protected (and will be bound) by the party who represents him. It seems fair to say that Hardwicke was suggesting something akin to this; namely, that Glasgow was bound because it was represented.
79
But beyond this we cannot go. 80 Indeed, the most significant point about the decision is the great difficulty of ascertaining what was the ratio decidendi.
Later writers attempted to explain the case as holding that a "passive party"--Glasgow-need not be joined. The resulting dichotomy of "active" and "passive" parties created much of the difficulty surrounding the indispensable party rule. 8 '
74. Baliol asserted other defenses, laches and estoppel, but these are irrelevant here. 75. It seems fairly clear that Glasgow was contending not merely that the decree did not bind it, but also that the decree was void because Glasgow was not joined. This is in substance the argument that underlies the indispensable party doctrine-a decree made in the absence of a vitally interested party is jurisdictionally defective. It should be observed that the argument was flatly rejected by Hardwicke.
76. Id. at 409, 88 Eng. Rep. at 539. 77. Glasgow had long delayed in making its objection to the original decree, allowing about thirty years to pass before bringing the instant proceeding. This could well be deemed laches or estoppel, though Hardwicke did not expressly refer to such concepts. Hence, the language quoted in the text may possibly be considered dictum.
78. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 85 (1942). 79. The facts disclose a situation that in later years might have been characterized as an in rem proceeding, an action in which a court determines the interests of all concerned in specific property. See id. § 32. It would be anachronistic to suggest such a basis for an eighteenth century decision.
80. In passing, it is worth noting Hardwicke's reference to the fact that Glasgow was a corporation. This seems to be a reference to the idea, prevalent in the nineteenth century, that a corporation cannot exist outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction in which it was created. See generally HENDERSON One final decision by Hardwicke should be noted, for it contains a reference to "formal" parties, a term later used in association with passive parties in the dichotomy mentioned above. In Jones v. Jones, 8 2 plaintiff executed a lease, apparently as security for a debt owed defendant, to certain trustees in trust for the defendant. Plaintiff charged in his bill, to which the trustees were not made parties, that he was fraudulently induced to execute the lease. Defendant made no joinder of parties objection at the pleading stage but did so at hearing. Hardwicke said:
[I]t will be too late to make the objection when the cause comes on again, if it was put off only for want of formal parties by the court, in order that the decree might be complete.
In a decree to account, if, during the account, any party should die, and a devisee of that party, or any other formal party as trustees (which is the present case) should be wanting, a bill to bring them before the court is not, in the strict sense of the word, a supplemental bill, but rather a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of revivor .... s3
It should be noted that Hardwicke did not say that formal parties need not be joined in the first instance; he said that the objection will be overruled if not timely taken. Hence, his language should not have been taken, as later it was, as distinguishing between those who must be joined in order to make a decree and those who need not be. On the contrary, Hardwicke recognized that formal parties were joined "in order that the decree might be made complete." In other words, he recognized that the decree could not be complete without the formal parties, but he was willing to make an incomplete decree because the objection had come so tardily. In later years, this understanding was distorted into the principle that while a decree can be entered without formal parties, it can not be entered if "nonformal" (or "active") parties are not joined. Hardwicke was willing to make an incomplete The earliest suggestion found of the formal party notion is in Kirk v. Clark, Prec. Ch. 275, 24 Eng. Rep. 133 (Ch. 1708). This was a bill by trustees, named in marriage articles, against the husband and others for specific performance of the articles. Defendants' objection to failure to join the wife was sustained, but it was ordered that the pleadings and depositions thus far taken were to stand notwithstanding the joinder of the wife as a new party. Ordinarily, depositions could not be read against those not party to the suit, so that when additional parties were joined the normal practice would require that the depositions previously taken be disregarded and new ones taken. Furthermore, joinder of an additional party ordinarily required amended pleadings. The fact that the court ordered the pleadings and depositions to stand suggests that the addition of the wife as a party was regarded as a purely formal matter, not altering the posture of the controversy.
In Bell v. Hyde, Prec. Ch. 328, 24 Eng. Rep. 155 (Ch. 1711), a reference is made that in terms connotes formal party. The suit was to collect a note executed by a wife to pay her husband's debts, in which plaintiff attached the wife's separate estate. The husband was not joined, it being alleged that he was in Rotterdam. Defendant's objection to failure to join the husband was overruled, the court saying that "the husband was joined in the Suit only for Conformity." Id. Like the earlier writers,s8 Gilbert did not mention the exceptions to the necessary party rule-absence, insolvency, etc. Moreover, while he pointed out that the real basis for compulsory joinder is to ensure that the absentees will be bound, so as not to leave a defendant in "precarious circumstances," he also relied on the artistic but unsound reason that complete joinder will permit entry of a "regular" or "uniform" decree. Holdsworth has noted that as the eighteenth century wore on, Chancery became increasingly preoccupied with the quest for "perfect justice," 88 for beauty and symmetry of form rather than utility of practical result. As we shall see, it was precisely this attitude that led to the indispensable party rule. Gilbert's language discloses this sentiment and foreshadows the rule.
Joseph Harrison, the other writer of the time, while less celebrated, seems to have been more accurate than Gilbert. proceed to a Decree, or if a Decree be made, it may be reversed; but if it be not reversed, yet none but such as were Parties and those claiming under them can be bound by it.
9
It should be observed that Harrison opened his general statement of the rule, quoted above, with the term "regularly," implying that this was the ordinary but not invariable rule. It should be noted further that Harrison recognized that a party not joined was not bound. The author then proceeded to give examples of situations in which joinder was required and situations in which joinder was excused, as when one of two co-executors or co-factors is beyond the sea. The remaining writer was Robert Hinde, whose Modern Practice of the High Court of Chancery was published in 1786. He gave a general statement of the necessary party rule, followed by a series of more or less disconnected case squibs, much in the manner of the writers before Mitford. 95 In a passage that with minor changes is taken from Gilbert,"" Hinde reiterated the idea of doing "complete" justice. There were also scattered references to the parties rules in connection with Hinde's discussions of the procedural devices by which the want of parties may be raised. Id.
at 151, 171, 420-22. He states the general rule as follows:
The bill must call all necessary parties, who may be affected by the demand, before the court; for if upon the face of the bill it appears that any whose right or interest are concerned, or who ought to have been, are not made parties thereto, the defendant may demur to such bill; or if he does not, yet the court, upon hearing, will not, for want of them, proceed to a decree; or if it does, the decree may be reversed; or if it be not reversed, yet none but such as were parties to the suit, and those claiming under them, can be bound by the decree. 
A. Introduction
We have seen that until about 1780 the Court of Chancery had adhered with substantial consistency to what is presently known as the necessary party rule: all persons interested in a controversy should be made parties unless joinder is impossible or inconvenient. It was against this background of settled practice that the indispensable party rule emerged. The rule rests on the principle that a court should do "complete" justice or none at all. Such a principle is not only incompatible with the principles previously established, but is also impossible to follow in any workable system of judicial administration. The legacy of confusion and frustration inhering in the indispensable party rule must be laid to this quixotic quest. To compound the confusion, other decisions adhered to the old principles.
For the purpose of clarity, but at the risk of chronological discontinuity, the cases adhering to the old rules will be described first; those announcing the new doctrine of indispensability will be discussed thereafter.
B. The Old Rules
Banister v. Way 9 7 involved a creditors' bill to enforce a trust established by a testator for the payment of his debts; the defendants objected that the heir at law, who plaintiffs alleged could not be found, should be joined lest he later claim against the trustees that the will was invalid. The court, noting that the will was proved by attesting witnesses, said that the will was sufficiently established and "the heir at law, when he should appear, must get rid of it as he could."
98 This seems to be a weighing of the interests of the plaintiff creditors in receiving payment against the interests of the defendants in avoiding double liability, the outcome being determined by evidence indicating that defendants' risk would be small.
99
which no complete decree can be made; as where [describing various necessary party situations, taken from the decided cases] . . . . In these and all other cases, where the decree cannot be made uniform and complete, for as on the one hand, the court will do the plaintiff right, so on the other hand they will take care that the defendant is not doubly vexed, he must not be left under precarious circumstances, because of the plaintiff, who might have made all proper parties at first, and whose fault it was that it was not so done. 10 decided in 1792, is especially interesting because of its complex facts and the interesting arguments of counsel. The facts must be stated in some detail. An American mercantile partnership was in debt to plaintiff. By agreement with plaintiff, the partnership delivered tobacco to F, an English factor, to sell the tobacco, the proceeds to go to plaintiff to the extent of his debt, the balance to be remitted to the partnership. F sold the tobacco but retained the proceeds, claiming the partnership owed him an amount in excess thereof. Plaintiff brought his bill against F and one of the American partners, who was in England at the time. The other partner was alleged to be in Philadelphia and hence not amenable to process. The defendant F contended the American partner had to be joined.
John Scott, later Lord Eldon, appearing for defendant, argued:
[The absent partner] is charged to be out of the kingdom: but that is neither proved nor admitted: and even if that is the case, he is a necessary party. There are many instances, that causes must be stopped, if necessary parties cannot be got to appear. A joint owner of this property has such an interest in the account, that they cannot go on without him. So in cases of mortgage, where persons have an interest, causes are often obliged to stand over; and if such parties will not put in their answers, it is unfortunate; but the Court cannot go on .... All persons interested must be before the Court.
1°1
It should be noted that this is precisely the argument that is always advanced in support of the indispensable party rule: the court "cannot" go on, even if it is "unfortunate." Why it can not go on is not explained. Plaintiff's counsel was John Mitford, author of what came to be recognized as the leading English treatise on equity practice. 10 2 Mitford's argument was very simple: "It has been determined over and over, that where one of two partners is within the kingdom, and the other is not, the Court will proceed against the one."' 10 3
Buller, J., sitting in Chancery though his regular assignment was in King's Bench, overruled defendant's objection sub silentio and proceeded to the merits. The case is, however, the plainest application of the principle that joinder of ordinarily necessary parties is excused when impossible. There were other cases in like vein. 104 In one, the absentee was characterized as a appointed by the court, deposited the bankrupt's assets in a joint account; one assignee died, another went abroad; held, the other three assignees may withdraw the account INDISPENSABLE PARTY "mere formal party" and his joinder excused.
1 0 5 This appears to be the earliest reported case in which the "formal" and "informal" classification was used as the basis of decision. This classification added little more to that decision than it has to later ones.
C. Development of the Indispensability Concept
Opposed to these cases were those in which the indispensability notion developed. The startling thing about this development is the way in which the idea grew from casual dictum to apparently hardened rule in the course of but a handful of decisions. Ironically, the problem started with a dilemma of the scrivener in the office of the clerk of the court.
In Lowe v. Morgan, 10 A mortgaged a share that he owned in Covent Garden to M, who thereafter assigned it to T in trust for three named persons who had advanced money to A. One of these three then brought a bill to foreclose his interest. Obviously, this was a case in which sound procedural principles indicated that all the creditor-beneficiaries of the mortgage should have been joined. However, it appears that the parties acquiesced in the misjoinder. The problem arose when the clerical staff was called on to prepare the decree:
[T]he Register, finding some difficulty in drawing up the decree, applied to the Lord Chancellor, who said it was a new case, in respect of their being joint tenants, and that it would be impossible for one to foreclose without making the other two parties. The cause therefore stood over for that purpose.' 07 without joinder of those missing) ; Windsor v. Windsor, 2 Dick. 707, 21 Eng. Rep. 446 (Rolls 1788) (suggesting that it is sufficient to name an absent but necessary person as a party and pray process against him, to be followed by sequestration and ultimately hearing and decree despite his absence).
105. Fletcher v. Ashburner, 1 Bro. C.C. 497, 28 Eng. Rep. 1259 (Rolls 1779). A testator had established a trust under which land was conveyed to trustees to sell, the income from the proceeds to go to his widow for life, then to his son and daughter, remainder to the survivor of the son or daughter. Both son and daughter predeceased the mother, and on the death of the widow a contest for intestate rights developed between the testator's heir at law, who claimed that the entrusted property remained realty and descended to him, and the personal representative of the widow, who claimed that the entrusted property became personalty and should be distributed to him. The defendant argued that the son's personal representative should be joined. " [T] he Master of the Rolls was of opinion there were sufficient parties to sustain the question; that the personal representative [of the son] was a mere formal party, and that, if he thought proper to make a decree, a personal representative might be brought before the Master." Id. at 498, 28 Eng. Rep. at 1259. See also Head v. Teynham, 1 Cox 57, 29 Eng. Rep. 1061 (Ch. 1783), in which a testamentary trust had directed that the trustee sell certain property, the proceeds to be given equally to six children. Two of these children assigned their shares to an intermediate trustee for the benefit of two others of the children. In the bill brought to compel the sale, all the beneficially interested children were made parties but the trustee under the assigned shares was not. It was held that this trustee need not be joined, seemingly on the ground that he was merely a formal party.
106. which, though dictum on the point, became the leading case on indispensability. The suit was a bill by a second mortgagee against the first mortgagee in possession for an accounting of rents and profits. The prayer was that defendant pay himself what was due on his first mortgage, then pay plaintiff the balance on his second mortgage and, if the rents and profits were insufficient for these purposes, that the property be sold and the proceeds appropriately applied. Plaintiff alleged that the mortgagor was dead and that his heir, who should ordinarily be made a party in his place, was in America.
Defendant argued that the heir should be joined, for unless joined he would not be bound by the accounting and might subject the defendant to later suit and perhaps double liability. Plaintiff replied that if defendant's objection were sustained, plaintiff would in effect be deprived of any remedy at all. Both arguments, of course, were correct, and posed the problem that had previously been met by balancing the equities of the respective parties. Lord Chancellor Thurlow met the problem otherwise:
It seems impossible to me [to proceed] . . . without making the mortgagor or his heir a party. I admit the distinction has been taken as to proceeding in the absence of parties abroad, between their being active or passive parties, but the principal difficulty is, whether I can call the heir of the mortgagor a passive party. The natural decree is, that the second mortgagee shall redeem from the first mortgagee, and that the mortgagor shall redeem from him or stand foreclosed. I never remember a case where the decree has not been so perfected . .. .11
It is interesting to note that Thurlow first attempts to solve the problem by classifying the absent heir as active or passive. If this distinction had any meaning, it was as a basis for determining what absentees would be bound by the judgment, not what absentees had to be joined."' Furthermore, and here we have the benefit of hindsight, this classification more accurately describes the situation of parties after a decree has been entered-the res judicata effect of a decree-rather than the situation of those whose joinder is demanded so that they may be parties to the suit.
It appears from Thurlow's language, however, that the classification problem was not his primary concern. He was really concerned with the 108. It is difficult to see why it was "impossible" to prepare the decree. In the prior cases in which joinder of necessary parties had been excused the same problem must have arisen and there is no suggestion that it had proved impossible or even difficult for earlier clerks to frame a decree disposing of only those interests before the court. Moreover [Vol. 61 :1254
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fact that the decree could not be "perfected." He said that the "natural" decree in such situations would entirely dispose of the case and complained that this could not be done in the instant case. Of course it couldn't. It never can when absentees are involved. The question has always been whether the court will nevertheless do what it can, even if this means that a "perfect" decree will not issue.
The lamentable fact is that the whole discussion was really beside the point, for as the reporter observed, "It being suggested that the heir was expected to be soon in England, Lord Chancellor ordered the cause to stand over." . 1789) , the defendant gave a bond to X, who assigned it to plaintiff. X died, his estate not being administered. Plaintiff sought ne exeat against defendant until plaintiff could obtain administration of X's estate and thus join the administrator in a suit against defendant. The relief by way of ne exeat was refused because the suit, without a representative of the original obligee of the note, must be dismissed for want of "parties"! Cf. Ro One case is difficult to appraise. In Anonymous, 1 Ves. Jun. 29, 30 Eng. Rep. 215 (Ch. 1789), a motion was made to have title deeds, which had been brought before the court, delivered to a devisee. The heir at law was not a party to the proceeding. The motion was denied by Thurlow: "All parties having an apparent right, as an heir at law, must be brought into Court, before the Court will do any thing, which may affect their right: otherwise I might order these deeds to be delivered up to a party having no right." Id. at 29, 30 Eng. Rep. at 215. The tone of this language is similar to that used in Fell v. Brown, suggesting that the court will not do anything if it can not make a perfect and complete decree. On the other hand, the case seems properly interpreted as a recognition that the practical consequences of a decree, as distinct from its res judicata effects, may be highly important to absentees. In the days before recording, and when fraud and chicanery in family property affairs were by no means rare, it was a serious step indeed to commit the title deeds to the hands of a hostile or unreliable person. The ordinary practice of Courts of Equity in England when one party is out of the jurisdiction and other parties within it, is, to charge the fact in the Bill, that such person is out of the jurisdiction, and then the Court proceeds against the other parties, notwithstanding he is not before it. It cannot proceed to compel him to do any act, but it can proceed against the other parties, and if the disposition of the property is in the power of the other parties, the Court may act upon it. Id. at 240. This, it should be noted, is a proper application of the concept of a passive party-one who, while absent, has property interests that may be disposed of by a decree directed to those having management or control. The concept is in substance the same as the modern idea of an in rem proceeding.
118 The doctrine of Fell v. Brown quickly passed into American procedural law. The problem of necessary parties and the new rule of indispensable parties were of special importance in the federal courts. This was so partly because not all states had equity courts at the turn of the eighteenth century, so that the questions would most likely arise in federal courts, and partly because the federal decisions were more completely reported, so that they were destined to have greater precedent value. The principal reason for the acuity of the necessary parties problem in the federal courts, however, was that the necessary party rule ran afoul of the diversity requirement of federal jurisdiction.' 2 ' The purpose of the necessary party rule was to obtain joinder of all interested persons, with a view to complete determination of the controversy; at the same time, the diversity limitation on federal jurisdiction prevented the joinder of persons who, though interested, were not of properly diverse citizenship. 122 This collision between procedural objective and constitutional limitation had a distorting effect on the parties rules and made it perilous to undertake to formulate coherent parties rules. These difficulties were accentuated by the failure of the early American judges and writers to recognize that the doctrine of Fell v. Brown was a recent innovation and, worse, by an uncritical reading of Fell v. Brown. Out of this background grew the hardened tradition of indispensability that has caused so much trouble for later generations.
The first federal case dealing with the problem of necessary parties appears to have been Milligan v. Milledge.
1 23 Suit was brought in the Jnited
States Circuit Court for the District of Georgia by the administrator of the estate of a deceased English merchant against his debtor's legatees and devisees. The bill alleged that the decedent's executors, heirs, and other devisees were either insolvent or outside the State of Georgia. Defendant's objection that they were nevertheless necessary parties was sustained by the trial court.
would have moved the court. See also It re Dunbar, 8 Ir. Eq. 71 (1845) (testator left money in bank, in the name of three trustees, interest to be paid to testator's children during minority, then principal to be distributed; children, on reaching majority, demanded principal; court refused to order money to be paid because one of the trustees, long since absent from the jurisdiction, was not joined); Smyth v. Chambers, 4 Y. & C. Ex. 40, 160 Eng. Rep. 911 (Ex. 1840) (annuitant under a testamentary annuity assigned portion of annuity to plaintiff, who sought to collect it from testator's executors; court refused to proceed because annuitant, who was outside the jurisdiction, was not joined). On writ of error to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff relied on Cowslad v. Cely1 2 4 and Darwent v. Walton. 125 There is no report of an argument by the defendant in the Supreme Court, but the plea in abatement at trial contained an objection to the failure to join "all material, necessary, and indispensable and requisite parties .... ,, 26 The colloquy in the Supreme Court between Francis Scott Key, arguing for plaintiff, and Chief Justice Marshall indicates that the court was principally concerned with whether plaintiff could look to a devisee before having exhausted his remedies against the decedent's executors. Plaintiff argued that even if he were required to so exhaust his remedies, the bill should not be dismissed for failure to join the executor. 129. There is an early Virginia case that might have influenced Justice Washington at the time he wrote his opinion in Joy v. Wirtz. This was Hunter's Ex'rs. v. Spotswood, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 145 (1792), in which Washington appeared for plaintiff and Marshall appeared for defendant. So far as relevant here, the case involved a suit to reach the assets of a debtor, Campbell, who had left the state. The suit was commenced by publication under a Virginia statute allowing garnishment of assets of departed debtors. On appeal, Marshall, who represented the defendant charged with having the debtor's property, argued that the decree below was invalid because it did not appear that the required publication had been made, saying "[The absentee] was no party to the suit: and therefore a decree, against persons called upon to pay Isis money, would be as improper, as if he had been personally decreed to pay it." Id. at 149. To this, Washington replied that "no person could take advantage of this omission but Campbell, who had not appealed." Id. at 150. The court nevertheless ordered the decree reversed, so that the record could show whether the publication had been made. When this was made to appear, the decree was affirmed.
At first blush, this looks like an indispensable party case and Justice Washington could well have so remembered it. However, it seems clear that the real point was that a garnishee can properly raise objections to the publication against his debtor, lest he not have a valid judgment on which to base a defense should the debtor later sue for return of the garnished property. In this light, the objection that the publication was improper goes to the adequacy of the process that is the basis of the defendantgarnishee's own liability to pay over the debtor's funds. At any rate, this seems to be the interpretation of the case by later Virginia cases. See Craig v. Sebrell, 50 Va. [Vol. 61 :1254 concept a rule of the Supreme Court. 130 In any event, the case is the archetype, in problem, decision, and language, of the hundreds of indispensable party cases that have since appeared.
In Joy v. Wirtz, a number of creditors had executed a release of their claims against the defendant debtor. A bill was brought, initially by only two of the creditors, to set aside the release on the ground of mistake. Defendant's objection that all of them should have joined was sustained by Washington, in the following language:
Where the creditors are to be paid out of a particular fund, or are united in the same transaction, so as to produce a privity between them, all are to join; and the defendant shall not be obligated to litigate the same question with each separate creditor. . . . The object of the bill, is to set aside this release, which affected all the creditors equally, and in which they are all united. The Court cannot set it aside, in respect of part of the creditors, and leave it to operate against others; nor can we set it aside as to all, unless all were parties, either by name, or as being represented by a part, suing in the name of all.
13 '
Several aspects of this opinion warrant consideration. In" the first place, it has a curious combination of sound, practical reasoning-the desire to avoid a multiplicity of suits and inconsistent results-with just plain nonsense about the impossibility of setting aside the release as to some but not others. Second, the terminology used to describe the relation of the creditor's inter sese, "united in interest," is striking because it is precisely this term that later appeared in the Field Code to describe the conditions of required joinder. 133 Third, the facts of the case were, insofar as relevant here, pre- Finally, note should be taken of the court's clear invitation to the plaintiff to use the class suit device, an avenue of escape from the necessary partiescomplete diversity dilemma that has often since been traveled.
5
The plaintiffs were given leave to amend. They did not employ the suggested class suit but instead brought suit in the name of all the creditors except one DuBois, who was alleged to be a citizen of Pennsylvania. DuBois was not joined because he was a co-citizen with defendant and could not be made a party without ousting the court's jurisdiction. In this posture, the case presented the classic indispensable party situation in the federal courtsa situation in which a choice had to be made between deviation from the joinder rules or dismissal of the action.' 3 0 It is perfectly clear that the alignment of parties presented in the amended bill was, according to the rationale of justice Washington's first opinion, no better than that in the original bill. "All" the creditors remained just as "united" in the release as they had been before and if it was impossible to set aside the release with less than all the creditors joined in the original bill, it was just as impossible to do so with less than all creditors joined in the amended bill. Defendants promptly demurred again. Among the many extraordinary aspects of Joy v. Wirtz, the most extraordinary is that Justice Washington overruled the defendant's demurrer to the amended bill. In doing so,'3 he cited Fell v. Brown and stated what has come to be, with minor variations, the American doctrine of indispensable parties:
In deciding who ought to be parties, it is necessary to distinguish between active and passive parties; between those who are so necessarily involved in the subject in controversy, and the relief sought for, that no decree can be made without their being before the court; and such as are formal, or so far passive, that complete relief can be afforded to those who seek it, without affecting the rights of those who are omitted. mortgagee shall redeem the first, and that the mortgagor redeem him, or stand foreclosed on this account; the mortgagor or his heir, being an active party, the court cannot proceed without him ; and his being a party cannot be dispensed with, though he is not amenable to the process of the court. Many other cases might be mentioned, equally strong with that just cited; and, in all of them, the rule is so stubborn, that I doubt, if, under any circumstances, it can be made to bend to the plea of necessity. But, if a decree can be made without affecting the rights of a person not made a party, or without his having any thing to perform necessary to the perfection of the decree; reason, as well as adjudged cases, will warrant the court in proceeding without him, if he be not amenable to the process of the court .... 13s (Emphasis added.)
Washington then analogized, correctly it would seem, the case of the .English suitor beyond the seas to the American suitor who could not be joined in a federal court without destroying diversity. In a sense, neither is "amenable to the process of the court." Finally, Washington added that "the court will take care to make no decree to affect Mr. DuBois . . .,.
At the risk of taxing the reader's patience, the quotation from Joy v. Wirtz has been substantial. But this decision is the hinge on which the indispensability doctrine turns in American law. With due deference to the abilities of Justice Washington, it must be said that his opinion is utterly unsound.
In the first place, as previously pointed out, if ever there was a case in which it could be said that an absentee was indispensable, then surely DuBois was indispensable under the rationale of the rule announced by Justice Washington himself. Perhaps no better proof exists of the fatuity of the rule. After stating in his first opinion that the court "cannot set [the release] aside, in respect of part of the creditors, and leave it to operate against the others,' 1 40 Justice Washington tells us in the second case that "the court will take care to" do exactly that.
Beyond that, Justice Washington attempted to formulate the difference between necessary parties whose joinder may be excused and indispensable parties. The former, he said, are those who are passive or formal. The latter, he said, are those without whom a decree cannot be made. As indicated above, 1 41 this is not the true distinction between active and passive or formal parties. Formal parties are those who are not joined, and who need not be joined in order to completely and effectively dispose of the litigation, but who may properly be joined so that the decree will be correct in custodian before the court and who can therefore be brought to account despite their absence. 143 Both types are, of course, parties in whose absence a decree may be entered. There is no party whose absence prevents a decree.
There are parties whose absence prevents a complete decree, but that is something quite different. 144 Herein lies the fallacy of the indispensability rule.
IV. LATER DEVELOPMENTS
A. Treatise Writers
The history of the party rules in equity after Fell v. Brown and Joy v.
Wirtz is the story of fruitless efforts to reconcile the irreconcilable. Professor Reed has dealt with the cases.' 45 I should like to discuss briefly the work of the treatise writers.
Mitford was the first to consider the problem. His second edition was printed in 1787, the same year that Fell v. Brown was decided. It is not clear whether his manuscript was completed before that decision, but it appears that he knew about the case. Certainly he attempted to deal with the concept embodied in the indispensable party rule:
A suit may affect the rights of persons out of the jurisdiction of the court, and consequently not compellable to appear in it. If they cannot be prevailed upon to make a defence to the bill, yet, if there are other parties, the court will in some cases proceed against those parties; and if the absent parties are merely passive objects of the judgment of the court, or their rights are incidental to those of parties before the court, a complete determination may be obtained; but if the absent parties are to be active in the performance of a decree, or if they have rights wholly distinct from those of the other parties, the court cannot proceed to a determination against them. 46 It should be noted that Mitford reiterated the confusion between a court's ability to make a complete decree and its ability to make any decree at all. His footnote to the foregoing passage illustrates the sense of frustra- ). This was a bill for payment of an annuity against the tenants of the charged land. The principal dispute was whether the defendants had an equitable right to withhold the annuity in satisfaction of their claims against the plaintiff annuitant. The heir at law to the charged estate was not made a party. The court observed that the defendants very "properly" waived this defect; "properly," it would seem, because the heir was, at most, interested only incidentally in the dispute. The court proceeded to observe that in order to execute fully the obligation to pay the annuity-to clean up the case in its entirety-"we should have had the heir before the Court, and the will [by which the annuity was created] established; so as to execute it in toto, and not by piecemeal." Id. at 276, 30 Eng. Rep. at 341. But, recognizing that it could not dispose of all aspects of the case without the heir, the court proceeded to shape its decree in such a way as to secure relief to the plaintiff against the defendants, without reference to the rights and claims, if any, of the heir.
145 tion caused by the rule: "Hence there sometimes arises an absolute defect of justice, which seems to require the interposition of the legislature.' 147 One may well agree, especially with the benefit of hindsight, that a "defect of justice" often arises from application of the indispensable party rule. The remedy, however, need not be legislative; logic may help.
In Mitford's third edition, he added a footnote after the phrase, "a complete determination may be obtained," in the passage quoted above. In this footnote, he cited Attorney General v. Baliol College, 148 indicating clearly that he understood that case to contain an illustration of the passive party concept. It will be remembered that the Baliol College case held that a decree against the trustees of a trust, the res of which was in England, is binding on a beneficiary absent from the jurisdiction and not joined in the suit.
149
In both the second and third editions, Mitford recognized the rule that a party beyond the jurisdiction need not be joined, but he made no effort to point out the contradiction between the cases applying this exception to the necessary party rule and the doctrine of Fell v. Brown. 150 In the fourth work on parties to suits in equity. 162 Edwards had by far the best collection of cases of his time. He made practically no effort to generalize about the cases and no effort at all to resolve the indispensability puzzle. As an indexdigest of the early cases, however, his book is excellent. Frederic Calvert, of the Inner Temple, published A Treatise upon the Law Respecting Parties to Suits in Equity in 1837. This is a truly extraordinary book. While the bulk of it is a catalogue of parties decisions, it includes a long first chapter on the general problem of necessary parties which completely surpasses in clarity and analytical acuity anything that had been written on the subject and, indeed, most of what has been written since. Calvert's discussion is too long and too intricate to be restated here. Suffice it to say that he made the following points: (1) all persons who are interested should be joined, but only those who are joined should be bound by the decree, 1 63 unless represented by someone who is a party;164 (2) the term "interest," used to define those who must be parties, has two different meanings-interest in the out-of-court property or transaction giving rise to the litigation and interest in the controversy before the court as defined by the prayer of the complaint;165 (3) confusion of the two meanings of interest is found in the cases, so that the courts sometimes assume that because a person is interested in the property or transaction, he must be interested in the decree and hence must be joined before a decree can be issued;16 1 6 (4) the necessary party rule is a rule of convenience and the court should do less than a complete job when it must do either an incomplete job or no job at all. 167 Calvert met Fell v. Brown head on, though from a somewhat different direction than that taken in the present discussion of the case. Nevertheless, reflection on Calvert's points shows that he exposed the fallacy of the indispensability rule. According to his first point, one not joined is not bound. Therefore, it is absurd to speak of "affecting," in the res judicata sense, a person who is not a party. According to his second point, a person may be interested in a transaction or any specific property without being interested in the suit. Therefore, a suit can affect a transaction or property without affecting an unjoined person's interest therein. Calvert's distinction between interest in the subject mzatter giving rise to the litigation and interest in the suit as framed corresponds exactly to the distinction between a complete decree, disposing of all aspects of the subject matter, and an incomplete 162 decree, disposing of only some aspects of the subject matter.,, It is unfortunate that Calvert did not drive this point home more forcefully than he did. It is more unfortunate that his excellent analysis was obscured by Justice Story's more readable and vastly more popular, but vastly more confused treatment of necessary parties. In this country, at any rate, Story, not Calvert, became the leading authority.
B. Justice Story
The last of the early writers on equity procedure is, of course, Justice Story. His first edition appeared in 1838. The question is not what is the kind of relief which, under such circumstances as the plaintiff has stated, is umsally obtained, but what is the specific relief which the plaintiff in any particular suit has actually prayed. For instance, where there have been successive mortgages, "the natural decree is, that the second mortgagee shall redeem the first, and that the mortgagor shall redeem him, or stand foreclosed." To obtain this decree, the first mortgagee must be made a party to the suit; yet a second mortgagee may, if he chooses, pray a foreclosure against the mortgagor, and no relief against the first mortgage; by adopting such a course, he may avoid the necessity of bringing before the court the first morgagee or his representative. In a recent work (Calvert on Parties to Suits in Equity), which came to my hands since this whole chapter on Parties was written, it is stated, that the true rule is, that "all persons having an interest in the object of the suit (not, all persons having an interest in the subject of the suit), ought to be made parties," Calvert on Parties, 10, 11. Whether his criticism on the language of the authorities, and of the elementary writers, is well or ill founded, it does not seem necessary here to consider, as I am not aware, that it removes a single difficulty or doubt in examining the subject of parties. STORY, op. cit. supra note 169, at 74. Calvert's criticism was not of the "lansguage of the authorities" but of the logic of the authorities. His refraining of the formulation of the rule was an attempt to make clear his logical critique. In Story's subsequent editions, he adopted much of Calvert's treatment of parties, but without, I think, ever grasping what Calvert was driving at. Id. at § § 72, 76a-b (3d ed., rev., cop., & enl, 1844).
justice between the parties before the Court cannot be done without other parties being made, whose rights or interests will be prejudiced by a decree; then the Court will altogether stay its proceedings, even though those other parties cannot be brought before the It therefore does not seem too much to say that it was chiefly Story's prestige and influence that perpetuated the indispensable party rule and that prevented its reexamination until recent years.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Reed has traced the development of the case law from the early nineteenth century to the present.
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He has shown the endless difficulties into which the courts have been led in pursuit of the phantasy that the absence of a necessary party somehow prevents a court from proceeding to a decree. At times the courts have reached acceptable results by the simple expedient of ignoring the indispensable party rule and applying instead the older and sounder necessary party rule: all interested persons must be made parties except when it is inconvenient or impossible to require 171 8 ' the plaintiff brought an action in a federal district court for a declaratory judgment to establish his right to an interest in minerals as against the claims of four named defendants. Jurisdiction was founded on diversity, plaintiff alleging that he was a citizen of Texas and defendants were citizens of Arkansas. When defendants failed to appear, plaintiff obtained a default judgment against them. Defendants then moved to set aside the judgment, alleging and proving that some of them were citizens of Texas. The trial judge granted the motion as to the Texas defendants, but denied it as to the Arkansas defendants, ordering that the judgment to be amended to state specifically that "[the rights of the Texas defendants], if any, in the subject matter of this suit shall not be prejudiced by such amended judgment." As amended, therefore, the judgment determined plaintiff's rights as against the Arkansas defendants but stated that it in no way affected, as indeed it could not affect, the rights of the Texas defendants. The Arkansas defendants then appealed, contending that the Texas defendants were indispensable and that the court was without jurisdiction to render a judgment without joinder of the Texans. In sustaining the defendants' contention, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said:
It would not be possible for the court to uphold the plaintiff's contention as to the validity of this deed [under which plaintiff claimed title] without prejudicing the rights of the defendants that were eliminated by the court below in an effort to cure its lack of jurisdiction. The judgment appealed from established that deed as a muniment of plaintiffs' title, and if permitted to stand would seriously prejudice the right and title of all the defendants. The court did not explain how the absentees would be "seriously prejudiced." To conclude that there was such prejudice the court would be compelled to say that the judgment was binding on a person not a party to the action and whose rights were explicitly, if redundantly, reserved. Such a statement is simply not true. And if the statement is not true, it is nonsense to say that the absentee is prejudiced by the judgment. 183 i.e., because a complete decree could not be had. This is the indefensible result of the indispensable party rule.
I have attempted to show that the lineage of the indispensable partyrule is no better than its logic. Perhaps in time reason and authority will lead the courts to lay the ghost to rest. also be prejudiced by the parties' acting in accordance with a decree or judgment, as when a fund is distributed to creditors. But this prejudice does not result from the fact that the absentee is bound by the judgment, but because the practical value of a later suit by him may be impaired by the change of out-of-court circumstances. The prospect of such impairment is indeed a factor to be considered in determining who should be joined, i.e., who are necessary parties. See Reed, supra note 125, at 336-39. But the ole fact of such impairment is not ground for refusing to proceed, any more than the fact that a debtor's payment of a judgment will impair his ability to pay others is ground for refusing to proceed with a creditor's suit. And in no event can such a practical impairment occur when, as in Fouke v. Schenewerk, the judgment is simply declaratory, not requiring or involving change in out-of-court circumstances affecting the practical position of the absentee.
